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Abstract 
The Hang Seng Index Futures market before the 1987 crash 
was a very bullish market. The trading volume once was over 
40,000 contracts a day. People believed that investing in the 
HSIF market could generate great profit. so, a lot of them 
poured money into the HSIF market without understanding its 
risk. Actually, the market performance before the crash was 
hard to convince them that the contract might cause them to 
lose money. 
The market crash in 1987 hurt the investors badly. The 
HSIF market nearly collapsed in the crash. Finally, the Hong 
Kong Futures Exchange needed the government to provide loans 
to bail itself out. 
After 1987, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange has undergone 
a great degree of shuffle. However, the HSIF market is no 
longer respected by investors. The trading volume per day is, 
in most circumstances, only about 1,500 to 2,000 contracts. 
(Just after the crash, it averaged only 300 contracts a day.) 
The thin volume indicates that investors are not 
confident of the HSIF market. The lessons they learned in 
1987 still deeply sit in their memory. So, they are no longer 
interested in the HSIF market. 
Launching options on the HSI is under the consideration 
of the HKFE. A local securities firm even issues put and call 
warrants on the Hang Seng Index In the early April of 1992. 
The stock Exchange of Hong Kong 1S planning to establish a 
stock options market. 
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If the HKFE launches the options on the HSI, would the 
options market be successful in Hong Kong? Could the options 
get the investors' confidence and interest? 
This study will be divided into three major parts. The 
first part will review the HSIF market before and after the 
1987 crash. It will give an evaluation to the improvement of 
the HKFE and lesson learned from the crash. 
The second part will describe the features of options 
trading. Some options on indices which are available in 
worldwide markets will be introduced. This is to make general 
readers easily understand what options are. 
The last part mainly discusses the factors which would 
determine the success or failure of this new product. 
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Chapter I 
Methodology 
This report aims at analyzing the issues of the Hang 
seng Index Futures contract and studying the options on the 
Hang seng Index which is expected to be launched later by 
the Hong Kong Futures Exchange. The latter part of this 
report will focus on the issues concerning the development 
of this product. 
The data of the HSIF market was collected from 
periodicals, newspapers and books. The data of the options 
was collected from periodicals, brochures of other 
exchanges, books, and interviews with professionals. 
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Chapter II 
Issues about the HSIF market 
The establishment of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange 
The idea to establish a futures exchange was initiated 
as early as in 1973. After three years of examination by 
the Government, the Commodities Trading Ordinance was laid 
down. In 1977, the formation of the Hong Kong Commodities 
Exchange was approved by the Governor and the Executive 
Council. The exclusive right of operating futures contract 
was granted to a company, Seacom Holdings Limited. 
The HKCE first started with trading cotton and sugar 
futures contracts. Then soybeans and gold futures 
contracts were launched. Among these, only the soybean 
contract was popular because of the support of the Japanese 
investors who used the Hong Kong futures market. 
In 1982, the HKCE set up a committee to study the 
feasibility of establishing a financial futures market. At 
that time, a consortium of banks petitioned the Government 
for the exclusive right to launch a stock index futures 
contract. Finally, in 1985, the HKCE, allowing- the banks 
to join the Exchange, restructured itself into the Hong 
Kong Futures Exchanges. After restructuring, the HKFE was 
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no longer the subsidiary of Seacom Holdings Limited. The 
Commodities Trading ordinance was revised. On May 6, 1986, 
the HKFE introduced the Hang Seng Index Futures contract. 
The trading volume of the first day reached 1,075 
contracts. The volume went up to 40,147 contracts on 
September 11, 1987. 
The crash in october 1987 made the stock Exchange and 
the Futures Exchange suspend trading. When they were re-
opened, the markets plummeted. A total of $4 billion was 
arranged by the Government to bail the HKFE out. On 
November 16, 1987, the Governor set up The Securities 
Review committee to suggest how to ensure a healthy 
development of the financial markets. 
The Hang Seng Index 
A stock 'market index is a market indicator which 
tracks the general price level of stocks traded on the 
exchange. It consists of a representative sample of 
stocks. The index can be a standard by which investors and 
portfolio managers measure their investment performances. 
The Hang seng Index was first published in November 
1969. The original base 'day of the Index was on July 31, 
1964. In 1985, four Hang Seng Sub-Indices were introduced: 
finance; utilities; properties; commerce & industry. The 
base day of the Hang Seng Index was shifted to January 13, 
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1984. There are 33 stocks in the Indexl. The constituent 
stocks are subject to change. Every stock in the Index is 
represented in one of the four Sub-Indices. Each Sub-Index 
1S a discrete subset of the Index. 
The HSI is calculated on a weighted-average base of 
market value. Therefore, the impact on the HSI of a pr1ce 
change 1n any constituent stock is dependent on the 
capitalization of the company. The higher the 
capitalization, the greater the impact by the price change 
of the stock. This capitalization is derived from the 
price of the stock multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding. 
In recent years, generally, the coverage of the Hang 
seng Index has been maintained to represent 75% of total 
market value and 70% of total market turnover. 
The Hang Seng Index Futures contracts 
As early as 1n 1982, the public already cried for the 
establishment of a financial futures market so as to 
strengthen Hong Kong position as a financial center. 
Eventually, in May 1986, the Hang seng Index Futures 
contract was launched. 
After the launch, the trading volume experienced huge 
surge. within a year, the trading volume reached over 
40,000 contracts per day. The net open position once grew 
1 The constituent stocks are listed in Appendix 1. 
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to nearly 38,000 contracts a day. The trading volume of 
the HSIF contract was the second largest, only after that 
of the index futures of the S&P 500 of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. When the 1987 crash happened, the 
HKFE was on the verge of bankruptcy. The HKFE then 
underwent a significant shuffle. Nevertheless, the HSIF 
trading volume cannot recover to its former amount. 
The overall performance of the Hong Kong stock market 
1S measured by the Hang Seng Index, which is consisted of 
33 blue-chip stocks. The HSIF contract is traded on the 
HKFE. The contract size is $50 times the Hang Seng Index 
Futures. The trading months include a spot month, the next 
calendar month and the next two calendar quarter months. 2 
Anyone, who opens a position in the HSIF market, 1S 
required to pay an initial margin ($18,750 effective from 
late February of 1992) and to maintain a required margin. 
simply speaking, the price of the contract is tied to 
the HSIF. When the HSIF is 5,000 points, the value of the 
contract is $250,000. 
2 The arrangement of trading months has been revised after the 
1987 crash. The revised arrangement is stated here. 
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Table 1 Major Exchanges' Index Futures contracts3 
Exchange City Index Date began Number Average 
trading of daily 
stocks volume 4 
CME Chicago S&P 100, 11 Mar 83 100 283,002 
S&P 500 21 Apr, 82 500 51,145 
DTB Frankfurt DAX 23 Nov, 90 30 3,873 
FTA Amsterdam EOE 19 Oct, 87 25 2,259 
HKFE Hong Kong HSI 6 May, 86 33 2,073 
LIFFE London FTSE-100 3 May, 84 100 5,569 
MATIF Paris CAC-40 17 Aug, 88 40 8,026 
OSE Osaka Nikkei 225 3 Sept, 88 225 83,825 
CBOT Chicago MMI 6 Aug, 85 20 3,794 
Anyone who wants to open a position in the market is 
required to deposit an initial margin. If the index 
movement lS against the positions of the investors, they 
will be called upon to deposit more money in order to 
remain the margins. At the end of each business day, each 
future contract is marked to market. The net gain or loss 
for each margin account is calculated and a de bit- or credit 
transaction for each account is effected if needed. 
3 Data from Susan Abbott, "stock market indexes opening in every 
direction", Futures: The Magazine of commodities & options, 
volume 20, Issue 9, August 1991, pp. 40-42. 
4 To calculate the average daily volume, the data either from 
January to May of 1991 or since trading started is used. 
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The monetary gain or loss is the difference of the 
index between the opening and closing positions times $50. 
The settlement is through cash. The cash settlement system 
can slash the transaction cost and release the trouble in 
collecting stocks from the stock market for delivery. 
Table 2 The HSIF contract specificationS 
contract size: The Hang Seng Index Futures times $50 
Quotation: Index Points 
Minimum Fluctuation: One Index Point ($50) 
Maximum Fluctuation: 300 points per trading session above or below 
the last closing quotation. No limit is 
imposed on the spot month. 
Trading Hours: 
Delivery Months: 
Last Trading Day: 
settlement Day: 




Spot month, the next calendar month, and the 
next two calendar quarter months 
The business day preceding the last business 
day of the month 
The first business day after the last trading 
day 
Final settlement Price: An average of quotations for the Hang Seng 
Index taken at five-minute intervals during 





the last trading day rounded down to the 
nearest whole number 
Cash 
$18,750 (subject to change) 
Not applicable 
since 1991, the HKFE has introduced several new 
products including the Hang Seng Sub-Index Futures 
contracts. Their contract sizes are based on the Hang seng 
Sub-Indices. Besides, the contracts are different in the 
aspects of the mlnlffiUffi margin, position limit and maximum 
fluctuation. 
Table 3 Differences of the Hang Seng sub-Index Futures 
Commerce & Properties Finance utilities 
Industry 
Maximum 300 450 300 300 
fluctuation 
Minimum $12,750 $22,500 $7,500 $12,000 
margin 
position 300 250 300 300 
limit 
(contracts) 
Features of futures trading 
Because the specification of futures contract is 
standardized, it is possible to liquidate a position by 
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simply doing an opposite trade and no obligation of 
delivery is required. The contract, therefore, is highly 
transferable and traded freely in the market. 
The people, who open positions in a futures market, 
need to put up initial margins. The amount of the initial 
margin is equal to a certain percentage of the contract's 
total face value. 
Because the wealth of the futures investors is tied to 
the stock market, they will lose if the market moves 
against their interest. For example, an investor opens a 
long position at 5000 points. If the market slumps by 300 
points, the investor will lose $15,000. If the slump 
further aggregates, the investor will suffer more if he 
does not settle his position. 
The price of financial futures contracts is determined 
by the supply and demand forces. Hedgers use the futures 
contracts to reduce their risk exposed in stock market. 
speculators play an important role in balancing supply and 
demand of the contracts. They will open their short or 
long positions in accordance with their expectations of the 
market movements. For example, a speculator can short 
futures contract in expectation of a downward market. If 
the expectation realizes, the speculator can buy the index 
futures at a lower price,' close his position and reap the 
profit. The transactions done by speculators increase the 
market liquidity and hence facilitate the trades. 
The futures market is a place where different parties 
can transfer risk to others. Risk-averse investors can 
reduce their risk; speculators bear high risk with a hope 
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to gain high return. Therefore, both hedging and 
speculation should co-exist in the market in order to 
facilitate trading. If either hedging or speculation 
vanishes I the contract is doomed to fail eventually. 
The 1987 crash and the HKFE 
On october 19, 1987 worldwide stock markets 
experienced great falls followed by the crash at Wall 
street. The Hong Kong stock market could not escape the 
killing. The Hang seng Index fell by 420.81 points on the 
same day, which represents 11.1% of the market 
capitalization. On october 20, 1987 the Hong Kong stock 
Exchange took action to suspend trading for four days. The 
Hong Kong Futures Exchange followed suit. 
The suspension of trading endangered the brokers' long 
arbitrage positions. The brokers were afraid of compulsive 
settlement of their short positions in futures contracts. 
Also, a large number of brokers' clients were not willing 
to maintain margins. Their defaults would bring the HKFE 
and many brokerage firms to bankruptcy. The stocks, which 
were longed by arbitrageurs, were under high pressure of 
selling in order to minimize the loss. If the HKFE were 
re-opened, it was believed that the index would plummet and 
a huge number of margin calls would be defaulted. The 
Government finally arranged two provisional loans totalling 
$4 billion to the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee corporation. 
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The Government, a group of banks and brokers were 
responsible for bailing the HKFE out. 
After the crash, people discovered that the HSIF 
market looked like a casino. A lot of clients went 
bankrupt. The trading volume dropped to only nearly 300 
contracts per day after the crash. 
The crisis in 1987 was largely due to the lack of 
monitoring in maintaining initial margins, the destructive 
characteristic of the market system and the misunder-
standing to the HSIF contract. 
The margin requirement of the HSIF contract was 
$15 1 000 initially and remained till the crash. During this 
period, the BSI climbed from 1800 points to around 4000 
points. Obviously, the margin was not sufficient. 
Besides, the clearing House only required its member firms 
to deposit their net margins instead of gross margins. The 
protection to either its member firms or investors fell far 
behind what was needed. 
In the stock market in Hong Kong, people were 
prohibited from short selling shares. people, longing 
index futures, could not short index constituent stocks in 
the stock market to hedge their risk. Their long positions 
in futures market were totally speculative. 
The sudden boom of the HSIF market was because of the 
apparently bullish stock market. The HSI was believed to 
increase forever. The market sentiment made people crazy 
for the HSIF contract. 
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Reforms 
since 1987, the HKFE has changed in several areas: 
(1) the HKFE becomes a not-for-profit entity so that 
conflict of interest between members and the 
public is minimized, 
(2) the clearing house is owned by the HKFE, 
(3) a Reserve Fund is set up to protect the HKFE's 
member firms against other members' defaults, 
(4) an audit/compliance function with enhanced 
surveillance, 
(5) the introduction of gross margining, 
(6) a more broadly-based Board of Directors, 
(7) better communications among the various 
functions of the Exchange and the clearing 
house, and 
(8) cautious determination to introduce new 
products. 
The HKFE was a private, for-profit entity and the sole 
exchange in Hong Kong for derivative trades. This role was 
in conflict with the interest of the public. Nearly 50% of 
the HKFE shares were in the hands of shareholders who did 
not actively trade in the HKFE. The monopolistic role 
definitely dampened its credibility and accountability to 
the public. 
The clearing house was a separate entity. Lack of 
communication between the clearing house and the HKFE was 
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an obvious issue. The amount of fund set up by the Hong 
Kong Futures Guarantee corporation Limited was determined 
by revenues generated through interests earned on margin 
deposits. In other words l the determination of the size of 
the fund was not tied to the market risk. Furthermore, the 
HKFGC was a limited liable entity. 
In May 1989, the Government's securities Review 
committee released their report into the operation and 
Regulation of the Hong Kong securities industry. Then, the 
HKFE underwent a reorganization. Now, it is a not-for-
profit entity. No dividend is paid out and the surplus is 
used to lower levies and renew technology. 
After the crash, the ownership of the clearing house 
is transferred to the HKFE and the CEO of the HKFE becomes 
the ex officio chairman of the Hong Kong clearing 
corporation. Therefore, the operation of the HKCC is under 
the supervision of the HKFE. 
The crash also disclosed the insufficiency of fund set 
up by the HKFGC. NOW, a $200 million dollar Reserve Fund 
replaces the previous fund set up by HKFGC. SOl any member 
firm's default will not easily cause trouble to other 
firms. The sources of the fund are (1) the HKFE member 
contributions, $100 million ($1.5 million from each 
member), (2) bank guarantees, $50 million & (3) $50 million 
in insurance. The Board of the HKCC reviews the size of 
the fund on a monthly basis. Based on the number of open 
positions, as well as the volatility of the HSIF contract, 
the Board will call for additional fund. 
13 
The rearrangement of the relationship between the HKFE 
and the HKCC removes the inconsistent maximum position 
limits allowed by the two parties in the past. previously, 
the HKFE determined the firm's position limit based on the 
firm's adjusted net allowable asset. The HKCC determined 
the limit by the net worth of the firm's asset. Now the 
open position limit is based on the firm's asset. 
Limits of open positions for the member firms are 
determined by the amount of the firms' assets. If any 
firm's open positions are unreasonable large, the HKCC will 
intervene and order the firm to stop opening new positions 
or settle existing positions. 
More staff are added to the audit and surveillance 
functions. The compliance division directly reports to an 
independent committee of the Board of the HKFE. This 
arrangement is to ensure that the investigation deserves 
reasonable freedom and the least interference. 
The Board of Directors of the HKFE has been widened to 
include a great variety of the local financial community. 
The Board is composed of6: 
Eoghan McMillan, manag~ng partner, Arthur Andersen & 
company (independent director); 
Sun Sun Chan, managing director, Sun Hung Kai 
commodities; 
sydney Leong siu Wing, chairman, Henry G. Leong Estate 
Limited (independent director); 
6 Data updated to December 1991. 
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Edgar W. K. Cheng, managing director, World-Wide 
Investment Company Limited (independent director); 
Fung Chi Kin, director, Ring Kun Company Limited; 
Goh Gen Cheung, director, standard Chartered Futures 
Hong Kong Limited; 
Bill Kwok Chi piu, managing director, Wocom Limited; 
Tommy Lee Cheuk Shun, director, Schroders Asia Futures 
Limited; 
Leong Ka chai, managing director, Roctec Futures 
Trading Company Limited; 
Werner Makowski, managing director, Dao Heng Bank; 
John Mansfield, chief executive, Wardley Limited; 
Geoffrey Yeh, chairman, Hsin Chong Group (independent 
director) . 
Margin is the deposit to guarantee the good faith of a 
client to pay for the full amount of the futures contract. 
The margin level is now reviewed by the HKCC. Margin 
methodology used by the clearing house is consistent with 
the methodology used in major international markets and is 
reviewed and approved by the Securities and Futures 
conunission. 
In October 1987, the net position could not fully 
guarantee the default risk. As a result, the HKCC has also 
removed its old net margin deposit system. It adapts the 
gross margin deposit system. The HKCC examines and 
collects the margins from the member firms everyday. 
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The evaluation after the reforms 
The reforms of the HKFE have showed success. After 
the reform, the HKFE is capable enough to weather through 
adverse market environment during the June Fourth Event in 
1989. 
In 1990, the SEHK and HKFE also put forward a plan to 
boost the trading volume of the HSIF market. The plan 
allowed the SEHK members to join the HKFE at reduced fees. 
Existing exchange members were permitted to subscribe for 
new ordinary shares of the HKFE. simultaneously the HKFE 
lowered the "special" or "lifeboat" levy from $30 to $5 per 
contract. The number of the HKFE membership expanded from 
76 to 81 after over one year of implementation of the plan. 
Another 18 firms are expected to join later. 7 
In early 1991 a New Product committee was set up to 
take up the duties of launching new products which 
previously were shared by a series of committees under the 
previous structure. 
After the recruitment of Gary G. Knight as the CEO of 
the HKFE in January 1991, the Hang seng Sub-Index Futures 
contracts and the Three-Month Hong Kong Interbank offered 
Rate Futures contract were launched. 
The daily average trading volume at the HKFE in 
December 1987 was just 795 contracts. It increased to 
2,112 contracts in February 1992. This is an increase of 
165%. 
7 Data updated to Jan 1992 
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Open interests have expanded to 2,079 contracts in 
october 1991 from 1,439 contracts a year earlier. The bid-
offer spread of the spot month contract narrows to one or 
two points from an average of five points a year ago. The 
narrower spread can enhance the liquidity of trading. 
The number of contracts per trade climbs. The average 
number of contracts per trade was 2.1 in 1991, compared 
with 1.5 in 1990. It indicates that the difficulty in 
doing large orders 1S slightly curtailed. An investor will 
not suffer from difficulty for trading 20 to 40 contracts 
in one trade at one price. 
In a word, the liquidity of the HSIF market is 
improved. The risk management system monitored by the HKCC 
is more consolidated. The bad image of "casino" for the 
Hong Kong Futures Exchange is removed. The trading volume 
of the HSIF market has increased steadily.8 
Several new products were launched by the HKFE in 
1991. The first product was the short-term interest rate 
futures on Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR). 
Trading volume was not disappointing initially. However 
this product faltered later. 9 
The second product, the Hang Seng Commerce & Industry 
Sub-Index Futures contract, was launched in July 1991. The 
8 A graph of the HSIF daily average lots from 1986 to 1992 is 
shown in appendix 2. 
9 Some people claim that the failure is because the i~terest . 
rates are determined by a small group of banks. Th~s exclus~ve 
right makes the public feel that the market is played unfairly. 
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volume of the first trading day was 67 contracts10 . The 
trading became very small later. ll 
Existing practice of the HSIF brokerage firms 
The practice of the HSIF brokerage firms before the 
1987 crash was blamed by the public as one of the causes of 
the crisis. The number of brokerage firms which 
participated in the HSIF market were far more than now. 
Some firms did not meet the HKFE requirement of capital 
adequacy. The clients' margin deposit were not monitored 
or collected properly. 
After the crash, some brokerage firms went bankrupt 
because of clients' defaults. Some firms which weathered 
through this crash withdrew from this market. 
Recently, only a small number of brokerage firms 
participate in the HSIF market. They are usually some 
well-established and capital-adequate firms, such as Sun 
Hung Kai Commodities Limited, Chow Sang sang Commodities 
Limited, peregrine Futures Hong Kong Limited, wardley 
Commodities Limited, Jardine Fleming Company Limited and 
Barring securities Company Limited. 12 Some firms, such as 
Jardine Fleming company Limited and Barring securities 
10 Data from The Economic Journal, July 17, 1991. 
11 Some people blame the failure of Hang Seng Sub-Indices on the 
unsuccessful launch of the Commerce & Industry Sub-Index 
Futures. Promotion of this contract was not enough before the 
launch. 
12 The companies cited here are only some examples. These 
examples are not all inclusive. Also the information is 
updated to February 1992. 
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Company Limited, only deal with institutional investors; 
retail investors are usually not welcomed. 
The initial deposits required by the firms vary. Some 
firms require an initial deposit of $500,000. Some firms 
require $20,000. After paying the deposit, then investors 
can take positions in the HSIF market. The minimum number 
of contracts which one is allowed to take at the same time 
varies among the firms. Some firms will accept one 
contract. Some firms will require at least 10 contracts. 
The transaction fees among the firms, however, are similar. 
only the calculation method is different. There are two 
ways of calculation. Some firms use single-trip system. 
(commission is charged when either buy order or sell order 
is done.) Some firms use round-trip system. (commission 
is charged when both buy and sell orders are finished.) 
Fees for single-trip system are around half of those of 
round-trip system. 
The HSIF contract is now marked to market everyday. 
Before the next business day, investors will be called to 
deposit additional fund if the market moves in the adverse 
direction against them. If investors cannot maintain the 
margins, their positions will be liquidated. Investors are 
liable for any resulting deficit in their accounts. 
Before the 1987 crash, some investors participated in 
the HSIF market even without knowing anything about it. 
The crash taught them a lesson. Investors argued that some 
brokerage firms did not carry out their responsibilities 
properly for not informing them of the risk involved in 
trading HSIF contracts. Nowadays, the brokerage firms will 
19 
explain anything related to the HSIF contract to interested 
investors. A risk disclosure statement should be signed by 
the investor who intends to take positions in the HSIF 
market. It is required by the Rule 431 of the Hong Kong 
Futures Exchange Limited and the Rule 1.55 of the commodity 
Futures Trading Commission. The purpose is to ensure that 
investors understand the risk of the HSIF market. 
Issues concernlng the HSIF investors 
The average daily volume of about 2,000 HSIF contracts 
ln February 1992,13 compared with the peak of almost 40,000 
contracts in october 1987, is definitely a small number. 
On one hand, the current market sentiment is less 
speculative. On the other hand, the small volume cannot 
provide enough liquidity to the institutional investors who 
trade in large orders. Their orders usually amount to 
several millions of dollars and should be done quickly and 
efficiently. They will rather use some OTC products or 
dynamic hedging strategy to hedge their risk instead of 
using the HSIF contract. 
Before the 1987 crash, the high volatility of the HSIF 
contract was unknown or ignored by investors; they were 
attracted by the apparently ever booming market sentiment 
in the early 1987. The collapse of the market made a lot 
of investors feel reluctant to participate in the HSIF 
13 Daily average for February 1992 is 2,112 contracts. 
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market again. It seems that a satisfactory return of 
confidence after the crash will never happen. 
Some people criticize that the small trading volume is 
a result of the relatively high transaction fees. Others 
believe that the public simply cannot get rid of the 
horrible lesson learned in october 1987. Therefore, even 
if the risk management system has been improved, investors 
still say no to the HKFE. The investors realize that the 
downside risk of playing futures contract is unlimited. 
Some investors are just reluctant to participate in this 
market. 
The regulation of the securities market deforms the 
development of the HSIF market. The prohibition of short 
selling makes the futures market develop into an asymmetric 
way. Short arbitrage, which is one of the ways to link up 
the spot and futures market, can only be half done. One 
can take long position in the HSIF market but cannot short 
sell the Hang Seng constituent stocks. The people who take 
long positions in the HSIF market are purely expecting 
further increase of the HSIF. 
stimulating the HSIF market 
The trading .volume of the HSIF experienced some 
increase in February and March of 1992 because of the surge 
of the stock market. However, the volume is still claimed 
by some people as being not liquid enough. 
21 
The go-ahead of the central clearing system and the 
legitimation of short selling will enhance the HSIF 
trading. The legitimation of short selling will also 
remove the market asymmetry. 
To boost the volume, the HKFE has planned to alter the 
existing trading system and introduce new products. 
Replacing the open-out cry system by the market-making 
system is under consideration. The options on the HSI will 
probably be available in 1992. The market-making system 
and the options on the HSI would partly rely on each other 
to succeed. If options on the HSI could boost the volume 
of trading in futures and options contracts, the market 
makers would make profit. 
TWo important questions are: what are the key criteria 
for a successful launch of options on the HSI? will the 
launch of options on the HSI really stimulate the trading 
of the HSIF market? The issues concerning the development 
of options on the HSI will be covered in Chapter Ill. 
--
Chapter III 
Issues about options 
Current News (updated to April 20, 1992) 
On April 3, 1992, peregrine Brokerage Company Limited, 
a securities firm in Hong Kong, issued 100 million put and 
call warrants on the Hang Seng Index14 . These warrants 
allow investors to hedge the index movement over the next 
two years. These securities are very similar to options on 
the HSI, which are under the consideration of the HKFE and 
will be offered to the public in late 1992 or early 1993. 
The stock Exchange of Hong Kong also plans to establish a 
stock options market. 
options allow investors to reduce risk, increase rates 
of return and capture gains under expected market move-
ments. 
. options 
There are two types of options. They are named: put 
and call options. Call options represent rights, within a 
14 The South china Morning Post, April 4, 1992. 
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certain period, to buy the underlying assets at an agreed 
price. Put options represent rights to sell the underlying 
assets at an agreed price. The agreed price is called the 
exercise price, the strike price, or the maturity prlce. 
The rights are not obligated to be exercised. If the call 
(put) holders exercise their rights, they will pay 
(receive) the exercise price (from) their counterpart so as 
to buy (sell) the underlying assets. For stock options, 
the underlying assets are stocks. For index options, the 
underlying assets are the index. since the index option 
holders are trading the stock index rather than any 
physical assets, they will payor receive cash to settle 
their positions. 
People use the word "premium" to denote the option 
prlce. The lowest options price is zero. There is a 
maturity for each option. The period is important because 
it greatly affects the premium of the option. The option 
holder is entitled the right to exercise the option only 
within the period. The last day an option holder can still 
exercise his option is called the expiration day. usually 
the longer the maturity, the greater the premium. 
The strike price also affects the option premium. For 
a call option, the higher the strike prices, the lower the 
premiums because of the less chance to exercise the option. 
One of the salient characteristics of options is that 
the downside risk oorne by buyers is limited. The maximum 
loss is the premium paid. Nevertheless, the gain of option 
buyers can be unlimited. For call option holder, he may 
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get a large profit if the asset price rallies. The 
potential huge gain 1S an attraction to option buyers. 
Besides option buyers, there are option sellers, or 
writers who write options and receive premiums. If option 
holders do not exercise their rights, the premiums will be 
the gain to the writers. In theory, when the asset price 
goes above the strike price, the call option writers' 
losses go point for point to the increase of the asset 
price. 
Appendix 3 contains the profit and loss patterns for 
options buyers and writers. People can easily 
conceptualize the characteristics of options by reading 
these patterns. using the combination of buy and put 
options, one can generate different profit and loss 
patterns. Three different combinations are cited here to 
illustrate the characteristics of options. 
If one expects that the value of the option will 
deviate but he is not sure which way it is going, he can 
buy the same number of puts and calls at the same time. 
These puts and calls have the same strike price and 
expiration day. This kind of combination 1S called a 
straddle. The buyer will make profit unless the value of 
the underlying asset does not change. (Appendix 4 shows 
the profit and loss patterns for a straddle. Patterns for 
strip and strap are also included.) 
If one expects that the chance for the value of the 
underlying asset to fall is higher than it to rise, he can 
buy two puts and one call. This combination gives him more 
chance to get profit when the value of the underlying asset 
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falls. He will make greater profit by the magnitude of 
price falls than by the same magnitude of price rises. The 
combination of two puts and one call is called strip. 
In contrast to strip, strap consists of two calls and 
one put. The buyer expects that the value of the option 
has high chance to rise although he is not sure that it is 
really going to happen. 
Some options can be exercised only on the expiration 
day. They are called European options. Some options can be 
exercised on or before the expiration day. They are called 
American options. certainly, American options give the 
holders flexibility to determine their trading strategies. 
American options also impose uncertainty to the option 
writers. 
Determination of option premiums 
What make the options appealing? 
(1) The prlces of the underlying assets 
The prlces of the underlying assets will determine the 
exercises of their options. Call options holders will 
exercise their options if the underlying asset price rises 
above the strike price. As the asset price increases, the 
value of the call options will increase. Put option 
holders will exercise the options if the assets price drops 
below the strike price. As the asset price falls, the 
value of the put options will increase. 
(2) Length of maturity 
26 
options can only be exercised within maturity. Once 
options expire, they become worthless. The longer the 
maturity, the more likely the price of the underlying asset 
rises above or falls below the strike price. Then the 
writers will lose. option writers charge high premiums for 
options which have long maturity. 
(3) Volatility of the underlying asset 
High volatility means that the price of the underlying 
asset will vary by a great amount within a short period. 
Therefore, option writers carefully determine the premiums. 
The chance for the writers to lose is high because the 
price of the underlying asset passes the strike price more 
likely. The writers will set high premiums. 
(4) strike price 
The higher the strike prlce of call options, the less 
chance the options will be exercised by the holders. The 
call writers, therefore, accept cheap premiums so as to 
attract option buyers. The lower the strike price of put 
options, the less chance the options will be exercised by 
the holders. So, the option premiums will be low. 
(5) Interest rates 
Usually, the cost of buying options are cheaper than 
that of buying stocks. The holders will pay the strike 
price only at the time of . exercise. The delay in payment 
is valuable if interest rates are high. So, wh~n interest 
rates go up, demand of options will increase. The option 
writers can charge high premiums. 
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options on the Hang Seng Index 
In Hong Kong the turnover of warrants in 1990 was 
about $18 billion15 compared with $271 billion of stocks. 
The features of options are very similar to those of 
warrants. Both have the rights to purchase or sell the 
underlying asset. However, warrants have a long maturity, 
usually two years or more. options have a maturity of 
several months only. 
options on the HSI are the instruments for investors 
to reduce their risk related to stocks and futures markets. 
Call options on the HSI are the rights to purchase the HSI 
at a given price within a given period. Similarly, put 
options on the HSI are the rights to sell the index at a 
given price within a given period. If options on the HSI 
are exercised, there is no delivery of any physical 
contracts. For example, a call option holder, who has an 
option with a strike (or exercise) price at 5,000 points, 
will exercise his right if the HSI rises above 5,000 
points. If the HSI reaches 5,100 points, the holder will 
gain 100 points. The settlement is in cash. 
Because options can be used by investors to hedge 
their risk in the HSIF market, the option trading months 
will be the same as those' of the HSIF contract. In other 
words, if the current month is April, existing futures 
trading months are April, May, June and september. Thus, 
15 Fact Book 1990, The stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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trading months of options are also April, May, June and 
September. 
Table 4 options on indices in worldwide markets16 
country Exchange Index Date Number Average 
and type of began of daily 
options trading stocks volume 
Finland FOM (EO)17 Finnish May 2, 25 3,317 
Options 1988 
Index 




Japan AMEX (EO) Japan Sept 27, 210 1,182 
Index 1990 
Japan OSE (0 ) Nikkei June 12, 225 40,175 
stock 1989 
Average 
Netherlands EOE (0) EOE May 18, 25 10,996 
Index 1987 
Switzerland SOFFEX ( 0) Swiss Dec 7, ,22 22,722 
Market 1988 
Index 
16 Data from Susan Abbott, "stock market indexes opening in every 
direction", Futures:The Magazine of Commodities & options, 
Volume 20, Issue 9, August 1991, pp. 40-42. 
17 EO means European Options. 0 means American Options. 
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UK LTOM (0, FT-SE May 3, 100 7,506 
EO) 100 1984 
Feb 1, 1,505 
1990 
US CEOE (EO) S&P 500 April 2, 500 50,765 
(SPX) 1986 
US CBOE ( 0) S&P March 11, 100 283,002 
100(OEX) 1983 
US AMEX (EO) Major April 29, 20 17,815 
Market 1983 
Index 
Features of options In other markets 
The above table shows that there are many options on 
indices which are traded in the world financial markets. 
Herein the S&P 100 Index options (i.e. the OEX) is chosen 
as an example to show the features of options on index. 
In 1973, the Chicago Board options Exchange was 
organized. The OEX options have been traded in the CBOE 
since 1983. The trading volume in 1989 reached 58,371,337 
contracts. , The S&P 100 Index is a measurement of the us 
stock market performance which is based on 100 blue chip 
stocks. OEX options allow investors to participate in a 
broad base of market with less transaction cost. They can 
use the OEX to manage their risk exposure, or to pursue 
speculative profits. 
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OEX options are exercised on or before expiration. 
Expiration months are the four near term calendar months. 
The contract size of the OEX is derived from multiplying 
the 8&P 100 index by U8$100. Premium is expressed in 
points and fractions. Each point is equivalent to U8$100. 
strike prices are usually set at five point intervals. The 
settlement of OEX options is in cash. 
A sample of quoted prices of the OEX 
8trike Calls- Puts-
price Last Last 
April May June April May June 
315 1 3/4 5 1/8 7 1/8 17 18 7/8 · . . . . . . 
· . 
320 1 3 3/4 5 7/8 24 5/8 23 · . . . . . . 
· . 
325 9/16 2 1/2 · . . .... 27 27 · . . . . .. 
· . · . 
330 3/8 1 9/16 · . . . . . . 34 1/2 34 · . . . . . . 
· . · . 
335 3/16 1 · . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . .. 
· . 
... . . 
· . 
When the current index is at 320 points, holders who 
exercise the 315 April would h~ve five-point in-the-money. 
Their accounts are each credited by U8$500. 
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Table 5 The 8&P 100 index option contract terrns18 
Underlying Index:-




Each index option contract represents US$100 (the 
index multiplier) times the current value of the index 
Margin requirement:-
Purchases: Must be paid in full 
Uncovered short positions: 15% of the underlying index 
value plus 100% of the premium received, less any out-
of-the-money amount. The minimum charge is 10% of the 
index value plus the premium. 
Expirations:-
S&P 100 index options expire on a monthly basis ln 
each of the four nearby months. The expiration day 1S 
the saturday following the third Friday of the 
expiration month. 
Premium quotations:-
Premiums are quoted in dollars and fractions per unit 
of the index. Each premium point represents U8$100. 
As with equity options, the minimum fraction is 1/16 
for option series trading at less than 3 and 1/8 for 
all other premiums. 
18 Extracted from OEX-S&P 100 Index options: Trading The Market-A 
New Perspective, The chicago Board options Exchange. 
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strike prices:-
Exercise prices are set at five point intervals to 
bracket the current value of the index. New strike 
prices are added when the value of the index 
approaches the limits of the existing strikes. 
Cash settlement:-
S&P 100 index options are settled in cash. No 
underlying securities are delivered. Upon exercise, 
the holder of the option receives the in-the-money 
amount--a cash amount equal to the difference between 
the closing dollar value of the index and the 
aggregate exercise price of the option. 
American exercise:-
The holder of an S&P 100 index option can exercise the 
option at any time pr~or to the final expiration. 
In the CBOE, there are long term options with a 
maturity of one or two years, such as the OEX and SPX 
LEAPS. Also there are options with predetermined limits on 
participation ~n market movements over which the holders 
benefit, such as the OEX and SPX CAPS. 
The OEX and SPX LEAPS are lo~g term options which are 
based on the S&P 100 and 500 indices. The underlying index 
for the OEX LEAPS is 1/10th of the S&P 100 index. The 
underlying index of the SPX LEAPS is 1/10th of the S&P 500 
index. The traditional options on index usually have a 
maturity measured in months. The LEAPS have a maturity 
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measured in one or two years. The LEAPS can let investors 
create long-term positions in options. 
The OEX and SPX CAPS are another kind of options. 
CAPS are initially listed with an at-the-money strike 
price. A cap of 30 points is set above the strike price of 
call or below the strike price of put. If the index closes 
at or above the capped price, the calls will be 
automatically exercised. If the index closes at or below 
the capped price, the puts will be automatically exercised. 
The holders of the options recelve a profit of 30-point 
capped interval. The writers of CAPS bear limited risk of 
30-point capped interval, in contrast to traditional option 
writers who have unlimited downside risk. 
Margin requirement 
A suitable arrangement of the margin requirement is 
important to the successful development of options trading. 
Here, a schedule of margin requirement by the CBOE is 
listed. 19 
19 The CBOE has board and narrow based index options. The above 
table only talks about the board based index options. 
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Pay for put or 
call in full. 
Deposit cash or 
cash equivalents 
equal to aggregate 
exercise price or 
put guarantee 
letter for a short 
put. Deposit 
option escrow 
receipt for a 
short call. sale 
proceeds not 
released until 
deposit is made. 




Margin Account Initial Margin Account 
Requirement Maintenance 
Pay for each put or 
call in full; cash 
need not be deposited 
in excess of put or 
call cost. 
100% of option 
proceeds plus 15% of 
underlying index value 
less out-of-the-money 
amount, if any, to a 
minimum of option 
proceeds plus 10% of 
underlying index 
value. 
For the same 
underlying index with 
the same index 
multiplier, the amount 
by which long put 
(short call) -aggregate 
exercise price is 
below short put (long 
call) aggregate 
exercise price; long 




For each short 
option, 100% of 
option market 
value plus 15% of 
the underlying 
index value less 
the out-of-the-
money amount, if 
any, to a minimum 
of option market 
value plus 10% of 
underlying index 
value. 




short Deposit put For the same For the same 
Put and guarantee letter underlying index with underlying index 
short and appropriate the same index with the same 
Call escrow receipt. multiplier, short put index multiplier, 
See short put or 
short call 
requirement. 
or short call short put or short 
requirement, whichever call requirement, 
is greater, plus the whichever is 
option proceeds of the 
other side. 
greater, plus the 
current option 
market value of 
the other side. 
options on index vs. options on index futures 
options on index are the rights to buy or sell the 
index at a given price within a given period. options on 
index futures are the rights to buy or sell the index 
futures positions at a given price within a given period. 
For a holder of option on index futures contracts, he has 
the right to take a position in index futures market at a 
given price. After he exercised his option, he has a 
position in index futures market. He still bears the risk 
related to the position. For a holder of option on index, 
after he exercised his option, he settles his position in 
' cash. 
Options on index vs. Index futures 
As mentioned before, options give the holders the 
rights to purchase or sell the index at a given price. If 
they do not exercise their rights, their losses are limited 
to the premiums. For the holders of index futures 
contracts, they are directly exposed to the risk of any 
adverse movement of the index. Their contracts are marked 
to market everyday. There will be a need of margin call if 
the initial margin cannot cover the loss due to the adverse 
movement of the index. 
The option prices are subject to the market forces. 
Since the options are not marked to market everyday, the 
option holders do not need to put up additional money by 
the request of margin calls. 
usually the option prices are lower than the marglns 
required by futures trading. 
leverage by buying options. 
The investors can create high 
This advantage of low entry 
cost can let investors start trading options even if their 
capital is limited. The leverage will be higher when 
investors purchase deeply out-of-the-money options with a 
short time to expiration. If the index really passes the 
, strike price, deeply out-of-the-money option holders will 
realize a profit. Then, the leverage may be as high as 100 
to 1 at that time. 
Futures contracts which mature in different months are 
usually traded at different prices. By experience, the 
difference, in most circumstances, is only a small amount 
relative to the index. For example, the difference of the 
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HSIF contracts for different months is around several tens 
of points. Based on the existing HSIF which is over 5500 
points recently, the difference is about 1/100th of the 
HSIF. Based on the experience in other markets, options 
which mature ln different months are traded at large 
difference. For example, if a near-term option has only a 
few weeks to go before expiration and it is out-of-the-
money, it might be selling for only one point. But an 
option which expires next month may be selling at 5 or 10 
points. The relative difference is very significant. 
When investors go short or long futures contracts, 
there is only one relevant price which is the index selling 
prlce. For option investors, they have the choice of 
buying puts or calls. Calls are similar to long positions 
in futures contracts. Puts are similar to the short 
positions in futures contracts. The prices of puts and 
calls may have large difference because of the market 
sentiment. This difference hence gives investors 
flexibility in options trading. 
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Chapter IV 
Issues of option development 
Lessons learned from the HSIF market 
The Hang Seng Index Futures contract is different from 
commodities futures contracts. The settlement of the HSIF 
contracts is in cash instead of delivery of commodities. 
The underlying asset of the HSIF contract is the HSIF. 
Investors are betting on the future movements of the HSIF. 
The boom of the HSIF market, which happened shortly 
after the market was established, was very interesting. At 
that time, the HSIF market was too early to be defined as 
well developed. The long hedging, which means longing 
futures and shorting stocks, was prohibited by law. The 
people seemed to ignore this imperfection. They continued 
to long futures contracts. 
The market sentiment before the 1987 crash was 
, absolutely bullish. The Hang seng Index climbed to new 
highs again and again. using little capital to take 
positions in futures market, retail investors could 
generate high leverage. They thought that their losses 
were limited to the margins they paid. This belief misled 
them to participate in the HSIF market. 
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When retail investors longed the HSIF contracts, 
institutional investors hedged easily by shorting the HSIF 
contracts. The turnover of the HSIF market expanded 
staggering. 
The 1987 crash badly hurt the HSIF investors. The 
HSIF trading volume shrank. Investors lost confidence in 
the market. Since then, the risk management of the HKFE 
has undergone significant improvement. 
It is obvious that, despite the prohibition of short 
selling and the insufficient measure of risk management 
system, the HSIF market was very successful initially. So, 
the evidence indicates that the turnover of an instrument 
was boosted by the market sentiment. Nevertheless, a 
destructive market system was the major force to devastate 
the market. 
Has the current trading volume of the HSIF market 
already reflected the market potential? Many people 
believe not. If the prohibition of short selling were 
lifted, the trading volume would increase. 
It is generally believed that there are two p:>ssible 
explanations of the small trading volume of the HSIF 
market. The first one is related to the liquidity of the 
market. Institutional investors usually argue that the 
small trading volume is due to the lack of liquidity in 
the HSIF market. If institutional investors do not trade 
actively, how comes the liquidity would start to be 
improved? The second possible explanation is related to 
the size of the investors' existing positions. 
Institutional investors badly need ways to hedge risk. If 
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they avoid taking additional positions in the HSIF market, 
does it mean th.at their existing positions already 
safeguard their risk? If that was true, the effort of 
improvement propelled by the HKFE would likely result in 
little return. 
To cut transaction cost would definitely pave the 'way 
for facilitating the HSIF trading. But how much cut is 
enough? could the lowered transaction cost attract more 
investors to take positions in the HSIF market, or 
encourage existing HSIF investors to take more positions? 
If the transaction cost was lowered, would the 
institutional investors come back to the HSIF market? 
Would the decreased cost justify the increased turnover? 
These questions should be considered. 
There is no doubt that, after the reform of the HKFE, 
the market has been going in the right track to provide a 
healthy market to investors. The default risk of clients 
and member firms is properly protected by the Reserve Fund. 
Investors should have had confidence in the market due to 
the improved risk management system. However the reality 
does not seem to be this. 
Investors' adverse impression to the HSIF market is a 
, very obvious cause that the trading v~lume of the HSIF 
market does not increase. ' people still remember the lesson 
learned in 1987. To change people's belief is difficult. 
The HSIF crisis indicates that the launching of other 
products should be carefully planned. 
The small trading volumes of the HSIF contract, 
futures on Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) and the 
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Sub-Index futures contracts make one wonder whether the 
local environment is suitable for the development of 
derivative products or not. What do investors really want? 
And the most important question is: would the introduction 
of options on the HSI follow the same bad outcome as the 
HSIF has experienced? 
The trend--derivative products 
popularity of derivative products is the trend of 
international financial markets. The first index futures 
contract, the Value Line stock Index Futures, was launched 
by the Kansas city Board of Trade on February 24, 1982. 
since then, the number of the index-related instruments has 
increased tremendously. There are more than 90 various 
products on at least 36 securities or futures exchanges ln 
17 countries. 20 Half of the products are introduced after 
the 1987 crash. 
In Hong Kong market, warrants are welcomed by 
investors. The turnover was about $18 billion in 1990. 
Investors like the volatility of the warrants. Their 
losses are limited to the premiums that they paid for the 
warrants. 
Based on the evidence of the prosperous warrants 
market, Hong Kong investors would favour the derivative 
20 Data from Futures: Tbe Magazine of commodities & Options, 
volume 20 Issue 9, August 1991. 
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products if the downside risk is bearable. warrants are 
this kind of instruments. 
The development of derivative products in Hong Kong 
seems to be successful only if the products would provide 
sufficient cushion on the downside and significant gain on 
the upside. Even if the frequency of gain is seldom, it lS 
not an issue concerned by investors. The characteristic of 
options seem to fit the investors' interest. 
Factors that make options on the HSI successful 
since warrants and options are quite alike. Regarding 
the trading volume of warrants in Hong Kong, there is less 
worry that the local investors would not be used to this 
kind of investment instrument. However, due to the 
unsuccessful launches of early products, such as the 
futures contract on HIBOR and the Hang Seng sub-Index 
Futures contracts, people may wonder how a new product can 
be successfully launched. 
Before studying the factors that promote the options 
market, the products that the HKFE recently launched are 
reviewed. The HIBOR futures are traded ~n the anticipation 
of the future movement of the short-term interest rates. 
However, the interest rates in Hong Kong are determined by 
a small group of banks. The group members have the first 
hand information of the interest rate movements. Though 
the members are not permitted to take advantage of the 
HIBOR futures contract, the credibility of this contract lS 
nevertheless discounted. 
The major advantage of the Hang Seng Sub-Index Futures 
contracts over the HSIF contract is that Sub-Index Futures 
contracts let investors fine tune their investment 
strategies. Investors can, according to their portfolios, 
trade the Sub-Index Futures contracts to hedge their risk. 
However, reality indicates that the Sub-Index 
contracts are not welcomed by investors. Some people argue 
that the lacks of promotion and education are the causes of 
unpopularity. 
Another cause may be that the investors do need the 
HSIF contract but not the Sub-Index Futures contracts to do 
hedging. Perhaps, their stock portfolios are already well 
diversified enough that they do not need Sub-Index Futures 
contracts. 
options on the HSI may not have the obstacles which 
block the development of the Hang Seng Sub-Index Futures 
contracts and the futures on HIBOR. The HSI is a well 
established stock market indicator. About 70% of the 
market turnover is covered by the index constituent stocks. 
The HSI is not similar to the interest rates which are 
manipulated by a small group of banks. If one wants to do 
hedging but declines to use the HSIF contracts, the 
alternative is options on the HSI. Even if investors hold 
diverse portfolios of stocks, they still need options to 
hedge market risk. 
A constructive risk management system, effective 
promotion and active education of the options on the HSI 
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become the major factors that would make the options on the 




In general, the launching of a new financial product 
1S challenging. It is especially challenging for the HKFE 
because of investors' regrettable experience with the 1987 
crash. Investors do not have as much confidence in the 
HKFE as before. 
The HKFE has been planning to launch the options on 
the HSI. This product may be available to the market early 
next year. Because of the experience of the Hang seng Sub-
Index futures and the HIBOR futures contracts, the HKFE is 
carefully planning the launching process. 
According to the turnover of the warrants market, 
there is less worry that Hong Kong investors would not 
understand the features of options, which are very similar 
to those of warrants. Besides the HSIF contracts, options 
on the HSI can serve as another means to hedge investors' 
market risk of their portfolios. Investors may favour the 
limited downside risk of options on the HSI. 
To avoid the undesirable consequence that the HSIF 
market has experienced after the 1987 crash, the risk 
management system for the trading of options on the HSI 
should be properly developed and managed. The facilities 
of the HKFE are capable of processing a great amount of 
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orders in a short period. The most important thing is that 
the interested option investors should be informed with 
enough information about options trading. Proper promotion 
and education of the options on the HSI are essential to 
the successful launch. The current market sentiment lS 
very bullish and this may help the launch of options on the 
HSI. The trading volume of options on the HSI may surpass 
that of the HSIF contracts. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 The Hang Seng Index constituent stocks 
(effective from 31 Jan 1989) 
Finance sector (4 stocks) 
The Bank of East Asia Limited 
Hang Seng Bank Limited 
HSBC Holding PLC 
Jardine strategic Holdings Limited 
utilities Sector (5 stocks) 
China Light & Power Company Limited 
Hong Kong Electric Holdings Limited 
The Hong Kong & China Gas Company Limited 
Hong Kong Telecommunication Limited 
The Kowloon Motor Bus Company (1933) Limited 
properties sector (9 stocks) 
cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited 
Great Eagle Holdings Limited 
Hang Lung Development Company Limited 
, Henderson Land Development Company Limited 
Hongkong Land Holdings Limited 
Hopewell Holdings Limited 
Hysan Development company Limited 
New World Development Company Limited 
Sun Hung Kai properties Limited 
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Appendix 1 (cont'd) 
Commerce & Industry sector (15 stocks) 
cathay Pacific Airways Limited 
Cavendish International Holdings Limited 
Dairy Farm International Holdings Limited 
Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Company Limited 
The Hongkong & shanghai Hotels Limited 
Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
Jardine Matheson Holdings Limited 
Lai Sun Garment (International) Limited 
Mandarin oriental International Limited 
Miramar Hotel & Investment company Limited 
swire Pacific Limited (A Shares) 
Television Broadcasts Limited 
The Wharf (Holdings) Limited 
Winsor Industrial corporation Limited 
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Appendix 5 First interview with the HKFE 
Date: March 6, 1992. 
An interview with: Ms. Ann Elaine Rutledge (EConomic 
Research of the HKFE) 
Dr. virginia A. Mumford (options 
Development of the HKFE) 
1. The HKFE has undergone a lot of changes after the 1987 
crash. The risk management system is improved. 
2. The HSIF market has successfully weathered through the 
challenge of the June Fourth event. This is an 
evidence that the HKFE is improved. 
3. The turnover of the HSIF market increases recently, 
compared with that just after the 1987 crash. 
4. The trading system of the HKFE is under consideration 
to change. Open out-cry system may be replaced by 
market making system. 
5. The communication between the clearing house and the 
HKFE is enhanced. 
6. The introduction of options on the Hang Seng Index lS 
under consideration. 
7. Public courses, articles on journals and newspapers 
and promotional materials are important to the new 
product development. 
56 
Appendix 6 Second interview with the HKFE 
Date: March 22, 1992. 
An interview with: Dr. virginia A. MUffiford (Op"tions 
Development of the HKFE) 
1. options are more retail-oriented. Futures contracts 
are institutional-oriented. 
2. The introduction of market-making system in options 
market will facilitate the trading of futures 
contracts. The options makers will use futures 
contracts to hedge their risk. Even if no market-
making system exists, traders also use futures 
contracts to hedge. 
3. To attract people to become market-makers lS by 
lowering their trading fees and releasing the 
requirement of capital adequacy. 
4. It is difficult for the market-makers to make market 
as the market moves very fast. The bid-offer spread 
1S hard to determine. 
5. There will probably have restriction of IDlnlIDUID Slze 
of contracts made by market-makers. 
6. The successful warrants market shows the potential of 
options market. 
7. Educational process of options market will be divided 
into 2 tiers. One is for institutional investors and 
brokers. Another is for retail investors. 
8. options trading months will probably be the same as 
those of futures contracts. 
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,\I.aiI· ~---------------------__ IIlIIBIS_ qw ne 
CUSTOMER AGREEMENT (INDIVIDUAL) 
11 TO . Finance Limited/ 
Futures Hong Kong Limited 
] ' Oate: Account Number: 
----------------------
~,~ ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
I, 1. Account Name (in English), Mr.lMrs.lMiss/Ms. 
---------------------------------------
(in Chinese) _________________________________ _ 
S' 2. Residential Address -----------------------------~-
________________________ TelephoneNo. ___________ _ 
~\ 3. Nationality _________________________________ _ 
~ 4. Passport &/or 1.0. Card No. 
-------------------------------
5. Marital Status --------------------~-------------------------
3 6. Occupation/Business _______________________________________ _ 
\ " 7. \ Name of Employer _______________________________ _ 
8. Position 
-------------------------------------
~, 9. Business Address 
------------------------------------
Telex No. _____________ Telephone No. _________ Fax No. ________ _ 
10. Reference Banks 
----------------------------------
{ You are authorised to obtain references from the above named reference banks. 
r You are, until instructed by me in writing otherwise, to send confirmation notes and statements to the following 
~' address: 
!, I am/am not* related to member of your staff or of directors of the , " Group. If related: 
,1' Name ------------- Relationship ---------------------
) (*Oelete as appropriate) 
i' I will advise you promptly of any changes to the information supplied above. 
I, I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the above information is true, complete, 
\ i up-to-date and correct. 
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• MM 
AS WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto the day and year first above written. 
The Schedule Above Referred To 
Name Address 
TELEPHONE: _____________ _ 
TELEX: _______________ _ 
SIGNED by the Customer:-
For Individual(s) 
Signature 
Name in block letters 








For office. use 
Accepted by: 
For and on behalf of 
Finance Limited/ 
Futures Hong Kong Limited 
Director 
Other Remarks: 
(i) Financial Consultant in charge _____________________________ _ 
(ii) ~ccount introduced by-----------------------~~--------
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APPENDIX FOR JOINT ACCOUNT HOLDERS 
NOTE: This appendix, on being signed by the customer, shall be treated as an integral part of the Customer's Agreement to which it is 
appended provided that it shall be wholly ineffective unless either Clause 1 (A) or Clause 1 (8) is crossed out. 
·-IMPORTANT 
Clause 1 (A) or 1 (8) must be 
crossed out before signing 
Customer's.lnitial 
• Delete as appropriate 
Customer's Initial 
To Peregrine: 
1. The customers hereby state that the customers are: 
(Ar Joint tenants with right of survivorship and not tenants in common. In the event of the death of either or any of the customers, 
the entire interest in any account opened on the customers' behalf shall be vested in the survivor or survivors on the same terms 
and conditions as theretofore held. The estate of the deceased shall have no interest in the assets of any such account at the 
date of death or in its operation thereafter. However, the estate shall remain liable for obligations in respect of such account 
as provided in Clause 2 below. 
(8r Tenants in common, each of the customers having an undivided interest in any account opened on the customers' behalf. In 
the event of the death of either or any of the customers, may, in the sole discretion of and without having 
to assign a reason thereto, either liquidate any such account or accept the instructions of the survivor, or a majority of the 
survivors, as the case may be, as to its continuance and as to the respective interest of the parties (including the estate) therein. 
In either event, the deceased's estate shall remain liable for the obligations of the account as provided in Clause 2 below. 
2. The customers hereby state that whether the customers are joint tenants or tenants in common, the customers' liability hereunder 
shall be joint and several. In the eventofthedeath of anyone of the customers, in the case of ajointtenancythe estate of the deceased 
shall remain so liable in respect of any obligations, debit balance or loss incurred before or existing at the death of deceased in respect 
of any account opened on the customers' behalf, and, in the case of a tenancy in common, the estate of the deceased and the survivor 
or survivors shall continue to remain jointly and severally liable for any obligations. debit balance or loss in respect of any such account 
(including those incurred in the liquidation of the account) until termination of the account. 
3. The customers will give immediate notice in writing of the death of anyone of the customers. In the event of the death 
of anyone of the customers, whether the customers are joint tenants or tenants in common, .' ~ may take such steps as 
oJ ~ shall in the sole discretion of . oJ ) (without having to assign a reason thereto) deem necessary or desirable to protect 
. . - with respect to taxes and other claims. Before releaSing any property held by . ,. _ oJ' ) for any purpose or carried by 
- , --_.' , _ in any account opened on the customer's behalf or which may be in I ' possession at any time and for any purpose, 
including safe-keeping, ~ _. _;:, '"'\ may require such proofs of death, tax waivers, other documents, and instrument of guarantee by 
the survivors and/or by the estate of the deceased as :' oJ ', may in the sole discretion of ~ . (without having to assign a 
reason thereto) deem necessary or desirable in connection with the liquidation or continuation of any such account. 
4. (A) The customers elect to have any account opened on the customers' behalf managed on the customers' behalf and the 
customers hereby nominate as the sole person(s) authorised to act for the customers 
with respect to any such account (hereinafter referred to as the "Manager", whether one or more person has been so nominated). 
Any such nomination may be revoked and any other person may be nominated in substitution therefore or addition thereto by 
"(a majority in number) (all) of the undersigned by notice in writing te - _ r _. may in all respects accept the 
instructions of the Manager (or anyone Manager, where more than one person has been so nominated) in respect of the 
administration and operation of any such account. Notwithstanding Paragraph 8 of the Customer's Agreement, so long as one 
or more persons have been nominated as Manager and notice of the death of such person (or of all such persons, where more 
than one person has been so nominated) has not been received by r- _ ' all notices and communications from " , 
shall be addressed to the Manager or, if more than one person has been so nominated. t6 the first-named, All dealings with 
the Manager shall be binding upon all of the customers. and the customers consent to all actions and omissions taken by 
- upon the instructions or representations of the Manager. 
(8) If a Manager has not been nominated pursuant to Paragraph (A) above, the customers hereby authorise: to accept 
and follow the instructions of any of the customers in all matters relating to the administration and operation of any account 
opened on the customers' behalf and to make payments to and to deliver and receive funds. securities, commodities or other 
property to or from any of the customers. In those circumstances ~ _. ~hall not be bound to enquire as to the customers' 
respective interests in any such account, nor as to the application of any property or funds withdrawn from it. 
5. The customers hereby ratify and confirm all transactions heretofore entered into by any of the customers in respect of any account 
opened on the customers' behalf. This Appendix shall be binding upon each of the customers and the customers respective heirs, 
legal representatives and assigns. 
Signature Signature Signature 
Name Name Name 
DATED THIS _________ _ DAYOF _____________________ __ 19 ___ _ 
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Futures Hong Kong Limited 
RISI( DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
(with 'off market warning) 
THIS RISK DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS FURNisHED TO YOU AS REQUIRED BY RULE'431 OF THE HONG 
KONG FUTURES EXCHANGE LIMITED AND RULE 1.55 OFTHE COMMODITY FUTURES TRAD'ING COMMISSION. 
The risk of loss in trading commodity futures contracts can be substantial. You should therefore carefully consider whether such trading is suitable 
for you in light of your financial condition. In considering whether'to trade, you should be aware of the following:-
1. You may sustain a total loss of the initial margin funds and any additional funds that you deposit with your broker to establish or maintain 
a position in the commodity futures market. If the market moves against your position, you may be called upon by your broker to deposit 
a substantial amount of additional margin funds, on short notice, in order to maintain your position. If you do not provide the required funds 
within the prescribed time, your position may be liquidated at a loss, and you will be liable for any resulting deficit in your account. 
2. Under certain market conditions, you may find it difficult or impossible to liquidate a position. This can occur, for example, when the market 
makes a "limit move". 
3. You may place "stop loss" orders with the brokerto liquidate your position when the market reaches the price you have specified; but placing 
contingent orders such as "stop loss" or "stop limit" orders, will not necessarily limit your losses to--the intended amounts;' since market 
conditions may make it impossible to execute such orders. 
4. A "spread" position may not be less risky than a simple "long" or "short" position. 
5. The high degree of leverage that is often obtainable in futures trading because of the small margin requirements can work against you as 
well as for you. The use of leverage can lead to large losses as well as gains. 
This brief statement cannot, of course, disclose all the risks and other significant aspects of the commodity markets. You should therefore carefully 
study futures trading before you trade. 
Under the Rules of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited, you are required to sign the enclosed form of ackoowledge.meot and returnit to us. 
Tbe Allies probibit 11S from transactingjlu.s.inass on your behalf Lintil we have received the form of acknowledgement from you. -
If you wish your broker to trade for you in markets other than those operated by the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited , you must ensure that 
your broker is permitted to trade in those markets and that you are f¥miliar with the requirements.of those marke~s. The Hong Kong Futur~~ Excha~ge 
Limited cannot and will not supervise your broker's trading on other markets and the Compensation Fund established under the Commodities Trading 
Ordinance is not available for defaults in respect of trading on other markets. 
~--
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RISK DISCLOSURE. STATEMENT 
I/We (1) _____________________________ ........-____ of (2) __ -
hereby confirm that I/We have received an? read the ~or~ of Risk Disclosure Statement required by the Rules of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange 
Limited and The Commodity Futures Trading CommiSSion. 
Dated:----------------------------------
(Signed) (Name in block capitals) 
Notes: 
(1) Insert name (2) Insert address 
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PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL 
, 19 
--~------------
LETTER OF AUTHORITY 




I/We hereby authorize you to transfer any funds standing to 
my/our credit on any account with you too Brokerage 
Limited/_ _ Futures Hong Kong Limited, or as they shall 
from time to time direct, so long as I/we shall continue to have 
an account with Brokerage Limited/ Futures 
Hong Kong Limited for which purpose you may make such 
arrangements with _. -_ Brokerage Limi ted/_ Futures 
Hong Kong Limited as you or they from time to time cons ider 
necessary or desirable. 
- -
The authority herein contained shall remain in force until such 
time as you receive written notice from me/us that I/we have 
revoked such authority. 
Yours faithfully, 
" / ~,</ 
-~----------/""::"" '''"'-" 
Authorized Signature(s) 
A/e Name . 
A/e No. 
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